

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 15357 01 OF 03 191717Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----126948 191719Z /43  
O 191650Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0502  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 15357

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR EG IS  
SUBJECT: ISRAELI RESPONSE - MEETING WITH FONMIN KAMEL

REF: (A) CAIRO 15294 (B) 155014

1. SUMMARY. MET WITH FONMIN KAMEL TODAY TO BRIEF HIM ON STATE OF PLAY AFTER ISRAELI RESPONSE AND TO GIVE HIM COPY OF DEPT'S PRESS GUIDANCE. I MADE PLEA THAT GOE FOLLOW PUBLIC LINE THAT VP MUBARAK AND I HAD DISCUSSED YESTERDAY. KAMEL SAW NOTHING POSITIVE IN ISRAELI RESPONSE. IT WAS IN FACT A RETROGRESSION FROM BEGIN'S RULE PLAN. KAMEL ACKNOWLEDGED SADAT HAD EARLIER AGREED HE SHOULD ATTEND LONDON CONFERENCE, BUT FONMIN REMAINED OPPOSED TO IT. HE ARGUED PARTICIPATING IN SUCH CONFERENCE A WEEK AFTER TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY ISRAELI RESPONSE WILL BE DEVASTATING FOR SADAT AT HOME AND IN ARAB WORLD. WILL HAVE SAME DIVISIVE EFFECT IN ARAB WORLD AS SADAT TRIP TO JERUSALEM DID. THERE WAS NOTHING MEANINGFUL TO DISCUSS AT SUCH A CONFERENCE. KAMEL ARGUED THAT MORE TIME NEEDED TO LAY GROUNDWORK WITH OTHER ARABS, AFRICANS AND NONALIGNED AS TO NEED FOR SUCH A MEETING. SAUDIS IN PARTICULAR WILL BE VERY UPSET AND WILL FIRST HAVE TO BE BROUGHT AROUND. IF GOE WERE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 15357 01 OF 03 191717Z

SURE USG'S SUGGESTIONS, WHEN MADE, WILL BE CLOSE TO REVISED EGYPTIAN WEST BANK/GAZA COUNTERPROPOSAL, IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE RISK. BUT NATURE OF USG PROPOSAL NOT CLEAR. KAMEL ASKED THAT DEPT STUDY CAREFULLY WHETHER SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE HELD JUNE 25, AS INITIALLY PROPOSED, OR POSTPONED FOR A TIME UNTIL EGYPTIANS AND WE CAN LAY GROUNDWORK. AS AN ALTERNATIVE

(WHICH HE PREFERS) HE PROPOSED THAT SECRETARY FIRST VISIT THE AREA TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH SAUDIS, JORDAN AND OTHERS ON BASIS OF REVISED EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL AND THEREAFTER CONSIDER WHETHER MEETING MIGHT BE CALLED. SHOULD THIS FAIL, USG WOULD BE IN THE POSITION TO PUT FORWARD ITS OWN SUGGESTIONS. IF SADAT INSISTS HE WILL GO AS LOYAL EGYPTIAN, BUT HE INTENDS STRONGLY URGE PRESIDENT TO REQUEST POSTPONEMENT. I AGAIN WENT THROUGH RATIONALE OUR SCENARIO AND SAID WE ARE OURSELVES CONSIDERING TIMING AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH AGAIN NEXT FEW DAYS. ON DEPARTURE, IN ANSWER PRESS QUERIES, I SAID I HAD NOT DELIVERED ISRAELI RESPONSE, WHICH STILL BEING STUDIED IN WASHINGTON, BUT THAT WE ARE CONSULTING WITH BOTH SIDES. I DECLINED CHARACTERIZE EITHER ISRAELI RESPONSE OR EGYPTIAN VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

2. HAVE JUST COME FROM HOUR AND A HALF MEETING WITH FONMIN KAMEL. AHMED MAHER WAS ALSO PRESENT. PRE-  
DICTABLY, KAMEL WAS DEEPLY UPSET ABOUT THE ISRAELI RESPONSE, BUT WAS ALSO SURPRISINGLY COGENT IN HIS COMMENTS. I TOLD HIM AMBASSADOR LEWIS IS SEEKING SOME CLARIFICATIONS AND ALSO GAVE HIM DEPT'S PRESS GUIDANCE SET FORTH REFTEL B. I THEN RELATED MY TWO TELECONS OF YESTERDAY WITH VP MUBARAK AND REITERATED OUR PLEA THAT GOE AVOID CHARACTERIZING ISRAELI RESPONSE AND SIMPLY SAY IT IS IN CONSULTATION WITH USG RE NEXT STEPS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 15357 01 OF 03 191717Z

3. KAMEL RECALLED THAT I HAD A FEW DAYS AGO SUGGESTED TO HIM ISRAELI REPLY MIGHT NOT BE ALL EGYPTIANS WOULD LIKE, BUT THAT ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS SHOULD BE ACCENTUATED. HE SAW ABSOLUTELY NO POSITIVE ASPECTS IN THE ISRAELI REPLY AS GOE HAS MONITORED IT FROM ISRAELI PUBLIC MEDIA. HE CALLED IT A RETROGRESSION FROM EVEN THE INADEQUATE BEGIN PLAN. SPECIFICALLY, BEGIN'S LATEST SUGGESTION THAT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY IN WEST BANK/GAZA WILL NOT COME INTO FORCE UNTIL PEACE IS ESTABLISHED HAD SET US ALL BACK. IT WAS SIMPLY THE LATEST INDICATION OF BEGIN'S INTENTION TO RETAIN THE WEST BANK/GAZA. HE DID NOT SEE HOW EVEN USG COULD FIND ANYTHING POSITIVE IN IT. I REITERATED TO KAMEL THAT WE ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATIONS FROM DAYAN TODAY AND THAT WE HOPE IN NEXT DAY OR TWO TO BE IN TOUCH WITH EGYPTIANS AGAIN WITH OUR THINKING ON HOW TO PROCEED. OUR PRESENT THOUGHT, I NOTED, IS TO TRY TO PROCEED ALONG LINES OF SCENARIO I HAD SKETCHED FOR HIM LAST WEEK. I NOTED THAT VP MUBARAK HAD TOLD ME LAST EVENING THAT SADAT IS STILL PREPARED TO SEND KAMEL TO A LONDON MEETING AS PROPOSED.

4. KAMEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SADAT HAD EARLIER AGREED THAT KAMEL SHOULD ATTEND SUCH A LONDON CONFERENCE. HE SAID THAT I CERTAINLY KNEW HIS OWN VIEWS: HE IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO GOING. HE SEEMED SURPRISED THAT EVEN AFTER THE ISRAELI RESPONSE, SADAT SHOULD STILL BE WILLING TO HAVE HIM GO. SUCH AN ACTION, KAMEL STATED, WILL BE "DEVASTATING FOR SADAT" AT HOME AND IN THE ARAB WORLD. EVEN ARAB FRIENDS, SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA, WILL ASK WHY, IN LESS THAN A WEEK AFTER ISRAELI "NEGATIVE AND INSULTING

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 15357 02 OF 03 191726Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----127016 191731Z /43

O 191650Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0503  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 CAIRO 15357

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

ANSWERS", SADAT SHOULD AGREE TO SUCH A GET-TOGETHER. IT WILL BE VIEWED AS A BEGIN VICTORY AND, ACCORDING TO KAMEL, WILL HAVE THE SAME DIVISIVE EFFECT IN THE ARAB WORLD AS DID THE SADAT TRIP TO JERUSALEM. ANY HOPE OF ARAB RECONCILIATION WILL BE SHATTERED.

5. APART FROM THIS, KAMEL SAID, HE DID NOT SEE WHAT SUBJECTS COULD BE DISCUSSED. I SUGGESTED HE COULD ASK DAYAN FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS OF ISRAELI RESPONSES, AND REVISED EGYPTIAN WEST BANK/GAZA COUNTER-PROPOSALS COULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED. KAMEL COUNTERED THAT CLARIFICATIONS CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH US AND OTHER WAYS CAN BE FOUND TO PRESENT EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSALS. HE DID NOT SEE WHY USG IS PRESSING FOR SUCH A MEETING WHICH, AS HE PUT IT, "WILL ONLY DESTROY ONCE AGAIN THE LITTLE CONFIDENCE WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ABLE TO BUILD UP WITH THE SAUDIS". WHY COULD WE NOT NOW PUT FORWARD OUR PROPOSALS? I REMINDED HIM OF THE PROBLEM THAT PRESIDENT CARTER FACES BECAUSE IT WAS EGYPTIANS WHO WITHDREW THEIR DELEGATION FROM POLITICAL COMMITTEE TALKS. KAMEL RESPONDED THAT WAS LONG AGO, NO ONE

SPEAKS OF IT NOW. I TOLD HIM THIS IS NOT QUITE RIGHT--  
THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS CONTINUE TO MAKE THE  
POINT. IF WE ARE TO PUT FORWARD OUR SUGGESTIONS AT AN  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 15357 02 OF 03 191726Z

APPROPRIATE TIME, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT USG POSITION  
ITSELF VERY CAREFULLY TO DO SO. I WAS HAPPY THAT SADAT  
UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR THIS.

6. KAMEL SAID HE HAD TO ACCEPT OUR JUDGMENT ON THIS  
MATTER, BUT THEN RAISED THE MATTER OF TIMING OF SUCH A  
MEETING. WHY SHOULD IT HAVE TO BE WITHIN A WEEK AFTER  
THE "TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY" ISRAELI RESPONSE. THIS  
WILL NOT ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME TO CONSULT THE OTHER ARABS.  
GOE, IF IT IS NOT TO AGAIN ISOLATE ITSELF IN ARAB WORLD,  
SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO SUCH A MEETING. THE REACTION OF  
OTHER ARAB STATES SHOULD FIRST BE SOUGHT. SAUDIS, HE  
NOTED, HAVE ALREADY DENOUNCED ISRAELI RESPONSES. IF,  
AFTER FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH ARABS, IT APPEARS THAT  
SUCH A CONFERENCE MIGHT BE FRUITFUL OR USEFUL, THEN  
HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO GOING. IF NOT, KAMEL SUGGESTED  
THAT USG, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH EGYPT, COME UP WITH  
ITS OWN PROPOSALS.

7. ANY SUCH CONFERENCE WOULD BE A "VERY SERIOUS" MATTER  
AND HE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT ITS TIMING IS ESPECIALLY  
IMPORTANT. SHORT LEAD TIME MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR GOE  
FULLY TO CONSULT WITH OTHER ARABS. EGYPTIANS WILL  
AGAIN BE DENOUNCED IN ARAB WORLD, INCLUDING THEIR SAUDI  
BENEFACTORS, AS WELL AS BY AFRICANS AND NONALIGNED.  
OAU AND NONALIGNED CONFERENCES ARE COMING UP AND GOE  
HAS SOME IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE AT THOSE CON-  
FERENCES. RUSHING INTO ANOTHER MEETING WITH DAYAN,  
ESPECIALLY AFTER NEGATIVE ISRAELI REPLIES, WILL SERIOUSLY  
WEAKEN EGYPTIAN IMAGE AND ROLE AT THESE TWO CONFERENCES.  
"REACTION AGAINST EGYPT WILL BE TERRIBLE", KAMEL IN-  
SISTED, AND GOE WILL AGAIN BE ISOLATED. GOE HAD OB-  
TAINED FRIENDLY ARAB AGREEMENT  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 15357 02 OF 03 191726Z

THAT MORE TIME WAS NEEDED TO OBTAIN POSITIVE ISRAELI  
RESPONSES. TO MEET WITH DAYAN WITHIN DAYS AFTER  
NEGATIVE BEGIN RESPONSE WILL BE VIEWED BY ARABS AND  
OTHER FRIENDS AS SURRENDER. SADAT, HE ALSO RECALLED,  
HAD RECENTLY PUBLICLY SPOKEN OF HIS READINESS TO TALK  
AGAIN TO THE ISRAELIS WHENEVER THEY COME DUT WITH

SOMETHING POSITIVE. IT IS STRETCHING THE IMAGINATION TOO FAR TO SEE ANYTHING POSITIVE IN BEGIN'S REPLY. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY SADAT, AFTER THESE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, IS STILL WILLING TO HAVE KAMEL MEET WITH DAYAN. IT WILL SHAKE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT AND HURT EVERYTHING WE ARE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE.

8. IN THIS CONNECTION, KAMEL RECALLED HIS MEETING OF LAST SATURDAY WITH THE PEOPLES' ASSEMBLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. ALTHOUGH KHALID MUHIDIN HAD BEEN PRESENT, MOST PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN GOVERNMENT PARTY OR RIGHTISTS INDEPENDENTS. THEY HAD UNANIMOUSLY PRESSED FOR STRONGER USG EFFORT WITH ISRAELIS. HE COULD HARDLY CLAIM TO PARLIAMENTARIANS THAT ISRAELI RESPONSES ARE POSITIVE.

9. KAMEL WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF THERE WERE SOME WAY GOE COULD BE SURE THAT USG SUGGESTIONS, WHEN THEY ARE MADE, WILL BE CLOSE TO REVISED EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL, GOE COULD AFFORD TO TAKE MORE RISKS IN THIS MATTER. GOE, HE ASSERTED, IS NOT ASHAMED OF THAT COUNTERPROPOSAL AND IS PREPARED TO DEFEND IT BEFORE ARAB WORLD. BUT WITH CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT NATURE OF USGPROPOSAL, GOE IS HARDLY IN A POSITION TO TAKE SUCH A CHANCE. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO CONSULT WITH THE EGYPTIANS BEFORE TABLING ANYTHING. HE SAID THIS WAS FINE AND DESIRED. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD COME LATER. IT WOULD NOT BE OF MUCH HELP TO GOE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 15357 03 OF 03 191730Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----127048 191732Z /43

O 191650Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0504  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 CAIRO 15357

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

IN MAKING DIFFICULT DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO MEET WITH DAYAN.

10. KAMEL ASKED THAT THE DEPT STUDY CAREFULLY THE PROS AND CONS OF OUR PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION. SHOULD MEETING BE ON JUNE 25, AS INITIALLY PROPOSED, OR SHOULD IT BE POSTPONED FOR A TIME UNTIL EGYPTIANS AND WE CAN TALK TO SAUDIS AND OTHERS AND LAY SOME GROUNDWORK. IF GOE LOSES SAUDIS AGAIN, KAMEL ASKED RHETORICALLY, WHAT WILL IT HAVE ACHIEVED. I SUGGESTED THAT, DEPENDING ON THE DECISION ON WHEN SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE HELD, WE TOO MIGHT HAVE TO WEIGH IN WITH THE SAUDIS TO GET THEM TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SUCH A MEETING. KAMEL SAID THIS WILL BE ESSENTIAL, BUT THOUGHT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE SAUDIS.

11. KAMEL THEN ASKED IF THERE MIGHT NOT BE OTHER ALTERNATIVES. PERHAPS SECRETARY VANCE MIGHT FIRST VISIT THE AREA AND DISCUSS MATTERS WITH SAUDIS, JORDAN AND EVEN SYRIA ON THE BASIS OF REVISED EGYPTIAN WEST BANK/ GAZA PROPOSAL. HE COULD POINT OUT THAT USG CONSIDERS IT USEFUL TO HAVE ANOTHER DIRECT TALK BETWEEN EGYPTIANS AND SAUDIS. SUCH LAYING OF THE GROUNDWORK WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR GOE TO GO. AFTER SECRETARY'S VISIT,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 15357 03 OF 03 191730Z

PRESIDENT CARTER COULD COME OUT WITH A PROPOSAL TO INVITE NOT ONLY EGYPT, BUT JORDAN AS WELL. SHOULD THIS FAIL, USG WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PUT FORWARD ITS OWN SUGGESTIONS. KAMEL ASKED THAT WE GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO HIS SUGGESTION.

12. KAMEL SAID THAT IF SADAT INSISTS THAT HE GO, HE WILL DO SO AS A LOYAL EGYPTIAN. BUT HE INTENDS STRONGLY TO URGE THE PRESIDENT TO REQUEST POSTPONEMENT AT THE VERY LEAST. WE AGREED TO BE IN TOUCH AGAIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

13. AS I WAS LEAVING, PRESS WAS ON HAND. ASKED WHETHER I HAD DELIVERED ISRAELI RESPONSE, I RESPONDED IN NEGATIVE AND EXPLAINED RESPONSE STILL BEING STUDIED IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, GOE HAD OBTAINED ISRAELI RESPONSE FROM ISRAELI PUBLIC MEDIA BROADCASTS. I NOTED WE ARE IN CONSULTATION WITH BOTH SIDES AND DECLINED TO CHARACTERIZE EITHER ISRAELI RESPONSE OR EGYPTIAN VIEWS. EILTS

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** CAT-B, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS, PLANNING MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 jun 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978CAIRO15357  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** CAIRO  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 2  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780646/aaaabnfv.tel  
**Line Count:** 325  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Message ID:** 60054186-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** NODIS, EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS, EXDIS  
**Reference:** 78 CAIRO 15294, 78 STATE 155014  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 13 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2303567  
**Secure:** LOCK1  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ISRAELI RESPONSE - MEETING WITH FONMIN KAMEL  
**TAGS:** PEPR, MPOL, PBOR, EG, IS, US, (KAMEL, MOHAMMED IBRAHIM)  
**To:** STATE SS MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/60054186-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014